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“Delay is no longer an option. Denial is no longer an 




All legislative proposals for a U.S. greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions cap-and-trade system released to date have recognized the need to safeguard the com-
petitiveness of U.S. firms that may be required to bear emissions 
compliance burdens heavier than those borne by their foreign 
competitors. These legislative proposals have included “com-
petitiveness measures” to ensure 
that emissions caps imposed 
on U.S. industries do not erode 
their competitiveness vis-à-vis 
imports from jurisdictions with 
no or lesser GHG emissions 
restrictions. The problem of 
“carbon leakage”—the incen-
tive created by declining domes-
tic emissions caps to move 
emissions-intensive production 
abroad—is particularly acute for 
manufacturing industries. Many 
such industries compete directly 
with imports, and most would 
not be able to pass on to their customers the increased costs 
of compliance or the acquisition of more efficient production 
technology. A properly designed U.S. climate change system 
should therefore legally safeguard the competitiveness of U.S. 
manufacturing industries, while also minimizing the incentive to 
move emissions-intensive production abroad.
Competitiveness measures can take a variety of forms. For 
instance, a “border adjustment” measure can impose costs on 
relevant goods at the time they are imported into the United 
States, assessed on the basis of either differences in the GHG 
emission restrictions in the country of origin as compared to 
the United States, or the emissions-intensity of the production 
process for the imported goods. Other forms of competitiveness 
measures include the free distribution of emissions allowances 
to industries particularly sensitive to foreign competition, the 
exemption of certain industries altogether from domestic emis-
sions caps, the imposition of carbon taxes, and restrictions on 
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certain production methods or incentives to adopt cleaner pro-
duction methods.
This article will focus on the use and consequences of a bor-
der adjustment measure, given that it is the competitiveness mea-
sure that is most consistently proposed in U.S. legislation, and 
that seemingly has the most significant exposure to challenges 
under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) agreements. This 
article will first provide some background on the broader climate 
change discussion in the United States. It will then discuss the 
reasons for including competitiveness measures in U.S. climate 
change legislation, the border adjustment measures included 
in recent U.S. legislative proposals, and the viability of border 
adjustment measures under the 
WTO agreements. The article 
will conclude with a new pro-
posal for an alternative to the 
border adjustment measures 
proposed to date.
backgrounD
The year 2009 promises to 
be an exciting year for propo-
nents of strong action to combat 
GHG emissions in the United 
States and internationally. Over 
the past few years, broad politi-
cal support for such legislation 
has grown domestically, while international efforts have con-
tinued to progress, in large part without the participation of the 
United States. Given the recent inauguration of Barack Obama 
as President, and the goals of the international community to 
conclude a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol in Copen-
hagen in December of this year, real action is expected to be 
taken in 2009 to limit carbon emissions both in the United States 
and around the world. 
Domestic competitiveness 
measures can ensure 
the equal distribution of 
costs in the absence of an 
international agreement 
limiting emissions.
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President Obama has made numerous statements to date 
expressing his commitment to addressing climate change. In 
spite of the uncertainty and turmoil caused by the ongoing finan-
cial crisis, he appears to be strongly committed to his original 
proposals. Specifically, President Obama has called for the 
implementation of an “economy-wide cap-and-trade program” 
that will aim to reduce GHG emissions eighty percent by 2050.3 
President Obama’s plan is distinguished by his calls for the auc-
tion of all emissions credits, unlike other plans, under which a 
portion of credits would be provided at no cost to vulnerable 
industries as a form of transition assistance. His plan differs fur-
ther due to his policy of using a portion of the proceeds from 
such emissions credit auctions (approximately $15 billion a 
year) for investment in the “development of clean energy and 
energy-efficiency improvements, including clean vehicles.”4
Importantly, President Obama has also pledged to “re-
engage”5 the international community through the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). Since early 
2007, international efforts to combat climate change have been 
focused on developing a successor agreement to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, which remains in effect until 2012. Rounds of negotia-
tions have been held, both to address the future commitments of 
nations that have already been bound by emissions caps, as well 
as to reach developing nations and countries such as the United 
States that are not bound by the Kyoto Protocol. An important 
breakthrough came at the negotiations in Bali in December 2007, 
where it was decided that developing countries would not neces-
sarily be excluded from future climate change control regimes.6 
Other rounds of negotiations have taken place since, leading 
ultimately to the negotiation of a final agreement in Copenhagen 
at the 15th meeting of all Framework Convention parties in late 
2009 that will replace the Kyoto Protocol. 
Given the state of the economy, and previous difficulties 
in passing legislation to establish a cap-and-trade system, there 
are significant doubts over whether meaningful legislation curb-
ing GHG emissions will be passed in the United States in 2009. 
Yet the concurrence of the Obama presidency, the pressure to 
have emissions limits in place domestically before concluding 
an international agreement on emissions caps in Copenhagen,7 
and the increased presence of Democrats in the U.S. Congress, 
all indicate that the passage of climate change legislation is far 
more likely now than at any time in the past.
Currently, Senator Barbara Boxer, Chairman of the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee, and Representatives 
Henry Waxman and Ed Markey, Chairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives Energy and Commerce Committee and the Energy 
and Environment Subcommittee respectively, are leading Con-
gressional efforts to develop legislation addressing climate 
change. On March 31, 2009, Representatives Waxman and Mar-
key issued a discussion draft of their climate change legislation 
entitled the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
(the “Waxman-Markey draft”). While a draft has yet to come 
out of the Senate, on February 3, 2009, Senator Boxer and other 
committee members set out six basic principles for legislation 
on global warming.8 It is likely that the draft produced in the 
Senate will rely heavily on the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner sub-
stitute amendment (the “Boxer Amendment”) to the Lieberman-
Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 (“S.3036”), which was 
originally introduced on May 21, 2008.9 Although the Boxer 
Amendment has never been debated and considered in Con-
gress to a significant extent,10 it represents the most advanced 
and comprehensive legislative effort on the Senate side to date 
addressing climate change. 
Generally, both the Waxman-Markey draft and the Boxer 
Amendment propose the establishment of a cap-and-trade sys-
tem to limit emissions domestically, along with a number of 
measures providing incentives for reduced emissions, and, in 
the case of the Waxman-Markey draft, the development of clean 
energy sources, clean technologies, and increased energy effi-
ciency. Importantly, both bills provide for competitiveness mea-
sures in the form of a “border adjustment” requiring “covered 
goods” imported into the United States to be accompanied by 
purchases of emissions allowances.11
raTIonale For IncluDIng  
compeTITIveness provIsIons
While commentators have expressed concern over the inclu-
sion of certain competitiveness provisions in climate change leg-
islation,12 there are a number of reasons why such provisions are 
useful and should be included in any proposed legislation.
First, competitiveness measures can provide an even play-
ing field for U.S. manufacturers and producers to compete in the 
domestic market against importers of goods from countries that 
lack emissions caps. Manufacturers in countries such as China 
and India, which are heavy polluters but currently are not sub-
ject to domestic or international limits on their emissions, would 
enjoy a significant production cost advantage over their counter-
parts in the United States under a U.S. cap-and-trade regime if 
no measures were taken to require these manufacturers to com-
pensate for the emissions they created when producing products 
for import into the U.S. market. In particular, energy-intensive 
industries, such as cement, glass, paper, chemicals, fertilizer, 
and metals manufacturers, would be adversely affected by U.S. 

















































declining emissions caps and their inability to compete with for-
eign producers who are not subject to such caps.13
The perceived need for protection of domestic manufactur-
ers is so strong that is it highly unlikely that any climate change 
legislation could pass the U.S. Congress without competitive-
ness measures. One reason given for the U.S. refusal to adopt the 
Kyoto Protocol was the fact that it did not impose binding com-
mitments on developing countries, which even then was per-
ceived as a threat to the competitiveness of U.S. industries. Given 
the uncertainty over whether developing countries will commit 
to emissions limits in the successor agreement to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, U.S. legislation will need to include competitiveness mea-
sures to compensate for non-participation by developing nations 
in future international climate change agreements.14
In fact, in a white paper produced by the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Committee on Energy and Commerce and its Sub-
committee on Energy and Air 
Quality (the “White Paper”), the 
drafters emphasized the need 
for competitiveness measures 
by linking them to the need 
to engage developing coun-
tries.15 They reasoned that, in 
the absence of an international 
agreement binding developing 
nations, domestic legislation 
needed to be structured in a way 
that would encourage devel-
oping nations to adopt similar 
limitations on GHG emissions 
domestically, and that such 
“encouragement” could include 
border adjustment measures, 
performance standards, and car-
bon market design conditions.16
The above emphasizes a 
second reason for competitive-
ness measures: they can also serve to encourage foreign countries 
to adopt their own domestic climate change measures. Foreign 
countries can be encouraged to adopt emissions limits by pro-
viding them with both positive and negative incentives to do 
so through U.S. legislation. Border adjustment measures could 
encourage the adoption of emissions limits in foreign countries 
in response to foreign manufacturers having to raise manufac-
turing costs by purchasing emissions credits. Alternatively, U.S. 
legislation could create positive incentives for foreign countries 
to adopt emissions caps by providing them with greater access to 
the U.S. emissions credit trading market, which is expected to be 
vast and lucrative for those able to sell credits on it.17
Third, the imposition of competitiveness measures can pre-
vent “carbon leakage,” a situation where the benefits of reduc-
ing U.S. emissions would be “offset by increased emissions 
elsewhere by foreign competitors that are thriving as a result of 
higher costs in the United States.”18 They could also be used as 
export adjustments, i.e., by providing emissions credits for free 
to U.S. manufacturers to allow them to compete equally in third-
country markets with foreign competitors who are not subject to 
emissions caps.19
Finally, competitiveness measures would ensure that other 
countries share the cost of reducing GHG emissions on a world-
wide basis, even if they are unwilling to adopt required limits 
on emissions themselves. Given that the ill effects of climate 
change are shared globally, the costs and burdens of eliminating 
emissions should also be shared globally. Domestic competi-
tiveness measures can ensure the equal distribution of costs in 
the absence of an international agreement limiting emissions.20
exIsTIng borDer aDjusTmenT proposals
While a number of border adjustment proposals in draft leg-
islation have been tabled to date, the Boxer Amendment repre-
sents the most comprehensive legislative effort to date. Although 
Senator Boxer currently is draft-
ing new legislation, it is likely 
that her new proposals will 
reflect the proposals made in 
the original Boxer Amendment. 
While the Waxman-Markey 
draft and Representative Chris 
Van Hollen’s Cap and Dividend 
Act of 2009 represent efforts 
currently under consideration in 
the 111th Congress, neither is as 
specific as the Boxer Amend-
ment on the border adjustment 
measures. 
The border adjustment pro-
posal in the Boxer Amendment 
essentially requires that, begin-
ning from January 1, 2014, “cov-
ered goods”21 from countries 
that have not taken “comparable 
action”22 to the actions taken in 
the United States to limit GHG emissions, must be accompanied 
by an appropriate number of emissions allowances in order to be 
imported into the United States. 
Specifically, this proposal would be executed by first, 
establishing a bi-partisan “International Climate Change Com-
mission” (the “Commission”) consisting of six commissioners 
appointed by the President in coordination with the Senate.23 The 
Commission’s key role would be to determine annually which 
countries have or have not taken comparable action to combat 
greenhouse gas emissions and to publish those determinations. 
Countries that are found to have taken comparable action, or 
that meet certain exemptions,24 are placed on an “excluded” list 
by the Commission.25 Importers of covered goods from these 
countries would not be required to submit emissions allowances 
under these regulations. All other countries would be placed on 
the “covered” list, and covered goods would have to be accom-
panied by emissions allowances when imported into the United 
States.26 The Commission would have enforcement powers 
Carbon leakage is a  
real concern in light of  
the possibility of a 
post-Kyoto Protocol 
international climate 
change agreement without 
equivalent obligations 
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to penalize companies importing goods without the required 
emissions credits.27 Such penalties could include payment of a 
penalty and even a prohibition on importing the goods in contro-
versy for up to five years.28
Under the Boxer Amendment, emissions allowances 
needed to accompany covered goods would come from a special 
reserve of allowances established by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA” or “Administrator”), which would also be 
responsible for establishing the pricing methodology29 for these 
allowances. The Administrator additionally would be respon-
sible for establishing a method for determining the number of 
allowances necessary for covered goods entirely manufactured 
and processed in one covered country, using a general formula30 
for calculating the number of allowances required “on a per unit 
basis for each category of covered goods that are entered into 
the United States from that foreign country during each com-
pliance year.”31 The Administrator would further be responsible 
for establishing the methodology for determining the number of 
allowances to be applied to covered goods manufactured or pro-
cessed in multiple foreign countries.32 
Finally, while most emissions allowances would come 
from the special reserve mentioned above, the Boxer Amend-
ment also allows U.S. importers to submit allowances issued by 
foreign cap-and-trade programs that are deemed to constitute 
“comparable action.”33 U.S. importers may also use credits from 
international offset projects authorized by the Administrator in 
lieu of international reserve allowances.34 These international 
offsets would be authorized as part of Title XIII Subtitle B of the 
Boxer Amendment, which describes international partnership 
programs such as the reduction of deforestation.35
The border adjustment measure of the Waxman-Markey 
draft differs from the Boxer Amendment in significant ways. 
The principal difference is that while the Boxer Amendment 
mandates that the border adjustment become effective from 
2014, the Waxman-Markey draft gives the President the dis-
cretion to impose a border adjustment, after making a deter-
mination that compliance with the U.S. cap-and-trade system 
continues to cause significant reductions in domestic production 
or domestic jobs, or an increase in greenhouse gas emissions by 
foreign manufacturing facilities manufacturing covered goods 
in jurisdictions without “commensurate” GHG regulations.36 
This determination is expected to be made no later than June 
30, 2017, as part of a reporting process by the President with 
the EPA.37 If the President decides to impose a border adjust-
ment, he must issue regulations no later than 24 months after the 
determination.38 From that point on, covered goods may only be 
imported into the United States with the appropriate number of 
allowances.39
The Waxman-Markey draft vaguely describes the parame-
ters for the border adjustment program, with the result that there 
are only a few points of comparison with the Boxer Amendment 
provisions. One similarity is that both drafts specify exemptions 
permitted for least-developed countries and countries emitting 
less than 0.5% of total global GHG emissions (i.e., a de minimis 
rule).40 The differences, however, are numerous. For instance, 
the border adjustment in the Waxman-Markey draft clearly states 
its intent of addressing “competitive imbalance” as a result of 
“direct and indirect” costs of complying with both the U.S. cap-
and-trade system and systems of other countries.41 Moreover, 
the definition of “covered goods” in the Waxman-Markey draft 
for purposes of the border adjustment measure does not broadly 
include imports of “manufactured items for consumption,” but 
only those designated as “primary products.”42 
Another principal difference in the Waxman-Markey draft, 
which also has significant bearing on this discussion, is that—in 
order to avoid the problem of carbon leakage43 while preserving 
the global competitiveness of industries affected by the carbon 
caps—the draft utilizes another competitiveness measure in the 
first instance to distribute “rebates” (essentially free credits) to 
the “owners and operators of entities in eligible industry sec-
tors,” beginning in 2012.44 Under this primary competitive-
ness mechanism, eligible industries would first be determined 
depending on whether they have an energy intensity or green-
house gas intensity of at least five percent, and a trade intensity 
of at least fifteen percent, as calculated by the EPA Administra-
tor according to methods described in the draft text.45 According 
to the draft, the number of rebates given to each eligible entity 
would equal “the sum of the covered entity’s direct compliance 
factor and the covered entity’s indirect carbon factor.”46 The 
draft further mandates an annual review of the rebate program, 
and allows for the EPA, beginning in 2021, to eliminate rebates 
if the Administrator determines that “more than 70 percent of 
the global output from a sector . . . is manufactured in countries 
subject to commensurate greenhouse gas regulation.”47
Importantly, the Waxman-Markey draft, unlike a number of 
earlier proposals, particularly emphasizes the need for the adop-
tion of clean technologies, clean energy sources, and energy effi-
ciency. For example, the draft proposes the adoption of a “smart 
grid” to improve energy efficiency; the adoption of technologies 
such as carbon capture and sequestration to reduce emissions in 
the air; and the provision of U.S. assistance to the developing 
world to encourage them to adopt clean technologies.48
The Cap and Dividend Act of 200949 is the most recent leg-
islation to be introduced imposing a border adjustment measure. 
The measure differs radically from the Boxer Amendment and 
Waxman-Markey draft provisions, in that it requires the impo-
sition of “carbon equivalency fees” on all imports of “carbon-
intensive goods.”50 The carbon equivalency fee would equal the 
dollar value amounts domestic producers have to pay to acquire 
carbon permits for the production of their goods, and any carbon 
equivalency fees paid by importers for carbon-intensive goods 
used in the production of their final manufactured items.51 This 
carbon equivalency fee would in turn be paid out to domestic 
producers of carbon intensive goods, to make up for the costs 
they incur.52 This provision will be terminated in the event that 
an international agreement is reached requiring carbon-emitting 
countries to adopt similar measures, or when carbon-emitting 
countries unilaterally adopt equivalent measures to those of the 
United States.53
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Prior and subsequent to the Boxer Amendment last year, 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives had introduced 
a number of bills containing border adjustment measures, which 
differed more or less substantially from the Boxer Amendment. 
S.3036, which the Boxer Amendment replaced, for example, 
contained significant differences in the timing of implementa-
tion, structure of oversight and implementation bodies, and the 
definition of certain terms.54 
Two pieces of legislation proposed in the House of Represen-
tatives also included border adjustment measures: H.R.6186, the 
Investing in Climate Action and Protection Act (“H.R.6186”),55 
introduced by Representative Markey, and H.R.6316, the Cli-
mate, Market, Auction, Trust & Trade Emissions Reduction 
System Act of 2008 (“H.R.6316”),56 introduced by Representa-
tive Lloyd Doggett.
The terms of the border adjustment measures under 
H.R.6186 are very similar to, if more simplistic than, S.3036. If 
H.R.6186 is the House’s counterpart to S.3036, then H.R.6316 
serves as the House’s counterpart to the Boxer Amendment. 
Much of the terms and structure of H.R.6316 replicates the pro-
posals in the Boxer Amendment. The fact that H.R.6316 was 
the latest piece of climate change legislation introduced into the 
House, and that it so closely echoes the direction and details of 
the Boxer Amendment, again reinforces the notion that these 
pieces of legislation will likely form the basis of some of the 
future legislative efforts to regulate GHG emissions, particularly 
on the Senate side.57 
are The exIsTIng borDer aDjusTmenT 
proposals consIsTenT wITh worlD TraDe 
organIzaTIon rules?
This section provides a brief overview of WTO rules that 
could be implicated by the border adjustment proposals described 
in the previous section, and discusses whether the proposals 
would survive scrutiny under those rules. Because the proposals 
for U.S. legislation are incomplete and likely to be substantially 
revised prior to passage, it is difficult to reach definitive conclu-
sions about the outcome of any future WTO challenge. How-
ever, notwithstanding this uncertainty, it is already quite clear 
which WTO rules would be implicated in such a challenge, and 
these rules provide an important roadmap for legislators hoping 
to “appeal-proof” a final bill.
At least three distinct WTO agreements could come into 
play in a challenge to U.S. border adjustment measures. The 
first is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).58 
The relevant GATT provisions can be divided into two groups—
first, the fundamental trade principles that WTO Members must 
uphold, and second, defenses that may be asserted to justify a 
breach. Thus, a finding of a violation of one or more of the fun-
damental principles may not necessarily lead to termination of a 
challenged measure if a legitimate defense is available.
One fundamental trade principle likely to come into play 
if legislation like the Boxer Amendment enters into force is the 
most-favored nation (“MFN”) clause of GATT Article I. The 
MFN clause at Article I:1 provides, writ large, that if a WTO 
Member gives advantageous treatment to imports of a given 
product from one WTO Member, it must provide the same 
advantageous treatment to imports of the “like product” from 
all the other Members as well. In short, a WTO Member may 
not discriminate by providing better treatment to imports from 
some countries than to imports from other countries. The obli-
gation set forth in Article I:1 is broad, applying “with respect 
to all rules and formalities in connection with imports.” Yet, 
the Boxer Amendment at Section 1316(b)(3) would seem to 
require this very mode of prohibited discrimination by imposing 
the importer allowance requirement on imports from countries 
deemed not to have taken “comparable action” to the United 
States to combat climate change, while relieving imports from 
other countries of this obligation. The MFN clause would thus 
seem to present a significant hurdle under the WTO rules for 
border adjustment mechanisms like the Boxer Amendment that 
treat imports from different countries differently.
Another GATT principle potentially implicated by bor-
der measures is set forth in Article II, pursuant to which WTO 
Members have agreed to “bind,” or fix, their customs duties on 
imports at levels laid out in national schedules of concessions. 
Under Article II:1(b), WTO Members have committed not to 
impose customs duties in excess of their bound levels. Nota-
bly, this obligation extends to “all other duties or charges of any 
kind.” The terms “all” and “of any kind” in this provision appear 
to encompass an importer allowance requirement of the sort pro-
posed by the Boxer Amendment.
The GATT contains another important prohibition on trade-
discriminatory treatment—the national treatment provisions of 
Article III. The general thrust of these provisions is that a WTO 
Member must accord treatment to goods imported from other 
WTO Members that is no worse than the treatment accorded 
to domestically produced “like” goods. Any border adjustment 
measure that imposes higher compliance burdens on imported 
goods than it imposes on domestically produced goods could run 
afoul of this national treatment requirement. Two elements of 
Article III are most likely to come into play in challenges to bor-
der adjustment measures. The first is the requirement of Article 
III:2 that imports shall not be subject to “internal taxes or other 
internal charges” that exceed those applied to the “like” domes-
tic products. The second is the requirement of Article III:4 that 
imports shall be subject to regulatory treatment that is no less 
favorable than that accorded to “like” products of domestic ori-
gin. A considerable body of WTO jurisprudence helps define 
the scope of these obligations—including the perpetually tricky 
question of how to define a “like” product.59 Unlike the vul-
nerability of an importer allowance program under the above-
mentioned GATT provisions, it seems possible for lawmakers 
to craft a program that would impose comparable burdens on 
imported and domestically produced goods alike. However, 
there is no broad guarantee that such an effort would succeed; 
if challenged, compliance with national treatment principles 
may have to be assessed on a product-by-product basis, and 
any incremental increase in the compliance burden imposed on 
importers could render the program vulnerable. 
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Yet another GATT provision that may be implicated by 
border measures is Article XI:1, pursuant to which WTO Mem-
bers may impose “no prohibitions or restrictions [on imports] 
other than duties, taxes, or other charges.” This proscription 
could readily be seen as applying to border measures intended to 
deter carbon leakage such as importer allowance requirements—
particularly if the market price for allowances were to rise to a 
level rendering importation cost-prohibitive.
As noted, a WTO Member may violate one of these funda-
mental principles, but still be able to justify the violation. Doing 
so would require invocation of one or more of the “General 
Exceptions” set forth in GATT Article XX. Two of the enumer-
ated exceptions are generally understood as providing possible 
cover for border adjustment provisions in a GHG emissions cap-
and-trade scheme. The first is sub-article (b), for measures “nec-
essary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” and the 
second is sub-article (g), for measures “relating to the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption.” Both of these exceptions appear sufficiently 
broad for lawmakers to craft border measures to fit within their 
parameters. Further, as a matter of intent, the GATT appears to 
leave room for WTO Members to pursue their own environmen-
tal policies and does not attempt to harmonize national policies.
However, fitting a measure within one of the Article XX 
sub-articles is not the end of the inquiry. Any defense of a mea-
sure under Article XX must also survive the test laid out in the 
chapeau of that Article itself, which provides that the measure 
may not be applied “in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” or a “dis-
guised restriction on international trade.” In short, Article XX 
does not shield protectionism masquerading as environmental-
ism. Would border adjustment measures that are, on their face, 
intended to safeguard U.S. industries from foreign competitors 
deemed to have an unfair cost advantage survive scrutiny under 
the Article XX chapeau? Opinions on this question vary, and the 
answer would ultimately depend both on the final wording of 
U.S. legislation as well as how it is implemented.
Further, a considerable body of WTO jurisprudence now 
exists on the Article XX chapeau, and provides some consider-
ations likely to be applied in any challenge to U.S. border adjust-
ment measures. For example, in the recent Brazil-Tyres case, 
the WTO Appellate Body struck down a Brazilian import ban 
on retreaded tires that exempted imports from MERCOSUR60 
countries. In a key passage in its holding, the Appellate Body 
reasoned that the trade discrimination (i.e., imports were gen-
erally prohibited, but not if originating in MERCOSUR coun-
tries) at issue was not “rationally related” to the environmental 
objective of the import ban.61 Another consideration likely to 
arise in any challenge to final U.S. border adjustment measures 
stems from the much-cited U.S.-Shrimp case, in which the WTO 
Appellate Body explained that the legitimacy of an environmen-
tal measure with a trade-discriminatory impact may be shown 
through earnest attempts by the importing country to negotiate 
an international agreement that would ensure equal treatment of 
all affected trading partners. Under this test, a “serious, good 
faith effort” to discuss a global climate change mitigation regime 
may be sufficient.62
A second WTO agreement that may be invoked to challenge 
U.S. border adjustment measures in cap-and-trade legislation is 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agree-
ment”). The TBT Agreement guides the application of technical 
regulations and standards in order to avoid unnecessary obstruc-
tions to trade. Technical regulations are defined in Annex 1 of 
the TBT Agreement as “document[s] which [lay] down product 
characteristics or their related processes and production meth-
ods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with 
which compliance is mandatory.”63 This definition may extend 
to requirements dealing with packaging, labeling, and marking. 
In the context of border adjustment measures, if the measures 
require that products be produced in accordance with certain 
emissions control criteria in order to be imported freely into the 
United States, for instance, this could trigger a TBT Agreement 
challenge. Although none of the current proposals contain crite-
ria that could be defined as a “technical regulation” for purposes 
of the TBT Agreement, the alternative proposal described at 
the end of this paper—as well as other proposals by commenta-
tors64—could trigger a challenge under these provisions.
There are four possible ways in which a challenge may 
be raised against border adjustment measures under the TBT 
Agreement. First, like the MFN and national treatment clauses 
described in the GATT discussion above, TBT Agreement Arti-
cle 2.1 requires that technical regulations must apply “no less 
favorably” to “like products” of WTO Members than to “like 
products” of national origin or of other countries.65
Second, under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, technical 
regulations must not be drafted or applied in a way that creates 
an “unnecessary obstacle to trade,” or more specifically, must 
not be “more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legiti-
mate objective.”66 However, under Article 2.2, legitimate objec-
tives may include protection of the environment. Therefore, if 
the U.S. Government were able to prove adequately that its tech-
nical regulations were designed to fulfill the objective of protect-
ing the environment, and did not do so in an overly-restrictive 
manner, then the technical regulations could survive a challenge 
under this provision.
Third, the TBT Agreement mandates under Article 2.4 
that, where international standards exist, they must be used as 
a standard for WTO Members’ technical regulations.67 In this 
case, no such global standards exist, but if new standards were 
adopted pursuant to the UN climate change negotiations, then 
these would necessarily have to serve as the basis of any tech-
nical regulations adopted in the United States, and if not, U.S. 
regulations could be subject to a challenge under this provision 
of the Agreement.
Finally, TBT Article 12 requires that WTO Members take 
into account developing countries in applying technical regula-
tions, particularly to ensure that such technical regulations do 
not impose unnecessary obstacles to trade with these develop-
ing countries.68 Although most border adjustment measures 
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proposed so far specifically exempt countries designated by the 
UN as “least developed” countries, any legislation imposing 
technical regulations should take this requirement into account 
as well.69
The third WTO agreement that may come into play in a chal-
lenge to a U.S. competitiveness provision more generally is the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM 
Agreement”).70 Exposure to claims under the SCM Agreement 
could arise in several ways. One possibility, applicable to a 
competitiveness measure that allocates emissions allowances to 
some domestic manufacturing industries (but not others) at no 
charge, would be a claim that the provision of free allowances 
under such circumstances constitutes an actionable subsidy.71 
Such a claim could be premised on a definition of “subsidy,” at 
Article 1.1(a)(ii), which covers government decisions to forego 
revenue that is otherwise due.72 However, for such a claim to 
succeed, the alleged subsidy would also have to be “specific” for 
purposes of Article 2—i.e., limited by law or in fact to certain 
enterprises or industries. Further, a complaining WTO Member 
could only prevail in such a case by demonstrating, under Arti-
cle 5, that the alleged subsidy is causing “adverse effects” to its 
interests.73 The obstacles to success in such a challenge would 
be relatively high.
While not directly related to the adoption of competitive-
ness measures, a second way in which the SCM Agreement 
might be implicated in relation to a national cap-and-trade pro-
gram is through the government’s use of proceeds from the 
sale of emissions permits. As noted earlier, President Obama’s 
climate change agenda calls for substantial government invest-
ment in a range of clean energy technologies. It seems feasible 
that such expenditures might be challenged by foreign govern-
ments seeking to nurture competing industries as impermissible 
or actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement. Notably, the 
SCM Agreement at its inception contained provisions insulating 
certain “green box” subsidies described in Article 8.2(c) from 
challenge.74 However, these exceptions were of limited dura-
tion, and expired in 2000 when the WTO Members could not 
agree on their continuation.75 The expiration of these provisions 
injects further uncertainty into the WTO risk analysis for any 
national cap-and-trade system designed to promote clean energy 
technologies.
Finally, the prospect of a WTO challenge to any competi-
tiveness provisions that might ultimately be adopted raises liti-
gation risk questions entirely apart from the application of the 
above-mentioned rules. One of the worst-case scenarios would 
be the imposition of different types of competitiveness provi-
sions by different jurisdictions, spawning multiple and overlap-
ping WTO challenges. The Director-General of the WTO, Pascal 
Lamy, has referred to such a scenario as a “spaghetti bowl,” and 
described the institutional problems it could raise for the WTO.76 
In this scenario, the WTO’s dispute settlement process may well 
be overwhelmed, both by the magnitude and complexity of the 
legal issues as well as the unprecedented trade values affected 
by the challenged measures. Further, regardless of the results of 
any WTO challenge to climate competitiveness measures, the 
imposition of the measures themselves may poison the ongoing 
UN negotiations towards a new global accord and invite retalia-
tory action.
These fears, even if speculative, point to the need for an 
international climate change agreement in which all countries—
developed and developing—accept responsibility for reducing 
worldwide GHG emissions. Indeed, this is the only viable solu-
tion to the climate change problem, and the only “exit strategy” 
for countries that have or will unilaterally implement cap-and-
trade systems domestically. Even if competitiveness measures 
pass WTO muster, they are only temporary measures until 
a global solution on climate change is achieved. In the mean-
time, domestic political reality in the United States (and in other 
advanced economies) dictates that no domestic GHG cap-and-
trade scheme can achieve adequate political support if it does 
not ensure the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing 
industries in light of the developing countries’ current stance on 
prioritizing “development” over carbon reduction. Thus, design-
ing competitiveness measures—and specifically border adjust-
ment measures—to maximize their chances of surviving a WTO 
challenge, to the extent permitted by domestic political reality, 
remains the task at hand.
mInImIzIng The rIsk ThaT a borDer aDjusTmenT 
measure wIll run aFoul oF wTo rules
The preceding sections show that robust border adjustment 
measures are a sine qua non of any final U.S. cap-and-trade sys-
tem that may be enacted, but also that any such measure could 
be subjected to a dizzying array of claims under WTO rules. 
How, then, might the risk of reversal in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings be reduced?
As noted in the previous section, one of the key design chal-
lenges for border adjustment measures from a WTO risk reduc-
tion perspective is how to avoid overt—and unlawful—trade 
discrimination. One way to avoid at least the surface appearance 
of discriminatory treatment would be to design a measure so that 
it does not apply at the border at all, but at the point of consump-
tion within the U.S. economy, for all emissions-intensive goods 
deemed to be vulnerable to carbon leakage.
Ideally, such a mechanism—which could take the form of 
a requirement to submit certain standardized amounts of GHG 
emissions allowances or offsets per quantity of the products at 
issue77—would apply to all GHG-intensive products, regard-
less of country of manufacture. Refunds or rebates would then 
be provided to suppliers able to certify that the products were 
produced subject to a requirement to submit such allowances 
or offsets (regardless of jurisdiction of submission).78 In other 
words, this adjustment measure would be geared to an objective 
emissions standard that is not, on its face, based on the country 
of manufacture of the product. The difficulty, of course, would 
be in the determination of the amount of allowances or offsets 
required per product, which could raise concerns under the TBT 
Agreement as previously noted.
The appearance of discriminatory treatment could be further 
reduced if suppliers would be permitted to satisfy the standard 
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based on the emissions intensity of the manufacturer of the prod-
uct at issue, as opposed to average emissions intensity for the 
sector in the country of manufacture, as currently envisioned 
under the Waxman-Markey draft. This would have the added 
benefit of encouraging the adoption of more efficient manufac-
turing technologies—regardless of the country in which they are 
deployed.
The above approach, while reducing the chances of being 
found to violate the GATT’s non-discrimination principles and 
border requirements, could also help buttress a defense under 
GATT Article XX. As noted in the previous section, a GATT 
Article XX defense can succeed only where the challenged mea-
sure does not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised trade restriction. Succeeding with 
such a defense is more difficult where the measure at issue, on 
its face, distinguishes between products based on their country 
of manufacture. In such cases, the measure would likely have 
at least the appearance of unwarranted trade discrimination—
especially if the ostensible purpose of the provision is to safe-
guard the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing industries. 
However, if the operation of the competitiveness measure can be 
moved from the border to the point of consumption in the U.S. 
economy, as proposed above, and where it operates based on 
an objective standard of manufacturing emissions intensity, it 
should be easier to demonstrate that the measure truly advances 
an environmental goal covered by one of the Article XX excep-
tions, and does not constitute a disguised trade restriction.
conclusIon
It is our hope that this article generates additional thought 
and discussion as part of the U.S. legislative process in 2009 
to craft an effective domestic cap-and-trade system, including 
the ability to successfully safeguard the competitiveness of U.S. 
firms that would likely have to bear heavier emissions compli-
ance burdens than most of their foreign competitors. Carbon 
leakage is a real concern in light of the possibility of a post-
Kyoto Protocol international climate change agreement without 
equivalent obligations undertaken by all heavy GHG emitters. 
An effective and WTO-consistent adjustment measure (whether 
applied at the border or at the point of consumption)—among 
all of the competitiveness measures—appears to stand the best 
chance of encouraging developing countries to meaningfully 
participate in a global solution to a global problem.
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[F]or a particular foreign country under subparagraph (2)(A), on a 
per unit basis, in an amount equal to the quotient obtained by divid-
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actions have been fully implemented, verified, and enforced—(A) 
the deployment and use of state of the art technologies in industrial 
processes, equipment manufacturing facilities, power generation and 
other energy facilities, consumer goods (such as automobiles and 
appliances) and implementation of other techniques or actions that 
have the effect of limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the foreign 
country during the relevant period; and (B) any regulatory programs, 
requirements, and other measures that the foreign country has imple-
mented to limit greenhouse gas emissions during the relevant period.
Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. § 1316(d)(2).
31  Id. § 1316(d)(1)(B). 
32  Under this methodology, each importer would (i) determine for each cov-
ered foreign country the number of allowances that apply to the category of 
covered goods manufactured and processed entirely in that covered foreign 
country for that compliance year; and (ii) of the allowance requirements identi-
fied for particular covered foreign countries, apply the requirement that imposes 
the highest number of allowances for the category of covered goods. The 
Administrator may allow importers to apply an alternate method for establish-
ing this requirement, but only if the importer demonstrates in an administrative 
hearing by a preponderance of evidence that the alternate method will establish 
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an international reserve allowance requirement that is more representative than 
the applicable requirement. Id. § 1316(d)(8).
33  Such programs represent a “comparable action” if the Administrator certi-
fies that the program (i) places a quantitative limitation on the total quantity of 
greenhouse gas emissions of the covered foreign country in terms of tons emit-
ted per year and achieves that limitation through an allowance trading system; 
(ii) satisfies criteria established by the Administrator for requirements relating 
to the enforceability of the cap and trade program, including requirements for 
monitoring, reporting, verification procedures, and allowance tracking; and (iii) 
is a comparable action.  Id. § 1316(e)(1).
34  Id. § 1316(e)(2).
35  Id. § 1316(e)(2)(A).
36  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Discussion Draft, 111th 
Cong. § 414(b) [hereinafter American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009]. 
Furthermore, a country will be determined to have: 
[C]ommensurate greenhouse gas regulation if (1) the country’s 
annual greenhouse gas intensity or energy intensity (as described 
in section 403(b)) for a sector or sub-sector is equal to or less than 
the greenhouse gas intensity or energy intensity for such sector or 
sub-sector in the United States in the most recent calendar year for 
which reliable data are available; or (2) the country has implemented 
policies, including sectoral caps, export tariffs, or production fees, 
that individually or collectively place a price on greenhouse gas 
emissions from a sector or sub-sector that is at least 60 percent of 
the cost of complying with title VII of the Clean Air Act in the 
United States for such sector or sub-sector, averaged over a two-year 
period.
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, § 405(b)(2).
37  Id. § 414(a).
38  Id. § 416(a).
39  Id. § 415.
40  Id. § 416(a)(1)(C).
41  Id. § 416(a)(2).
42  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, supra note 36, § 411(1). 
This section specifies “iron, steel, steel mill products (including pipe and tube), 
aluminum, cement, glass (including flat, container, and specialty glass and 
fiberglass), pulp, paper, chemicals, and industrial ceramics” as “primary prod-
ucts.” It also provides a “catch-all” sub-provision covering 
[A]ny other manufactured product that (i) is sold in bulk for pur-
poses of further manufacture or inclusion in a finished product; and 
(ii) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the product, direct 
greenhouse gas emissions or indirect greenhouse gas emissions that 
are comparable (on an emissions-per-output basis) to emissions gen-
erated in the manufacture of products [that were specifically listed 
earlier].
Id. 
43  Id. § 402(b)(1). Carbon leakage is defined as “any substantial increase (as 
determined by the Administrator) in [GHG] emissions by manufacturing enti-
ties located in countries without commensurate [GHG] regulation, provided 
that such increase is caused by an incremental cost of production increase in the 
United States resulting from the implementation of title VII of the Clean Air 
Act.”
44  Id. § 403(a).
45  Id. § 403(b).
46  Id. § 403(c). The direct compliance factor is equal to the “product of (i) the 
output of the covered entity; and (ii) 85 percent of the average [GHG] emis-
sions (expressed in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent) per unit of output for all 
covered entities in the sector or sub-sector, as determined by the Administrator 
based on reports provided under subparagraph (C).” The “indirect carbon fac-
tor for an entity for a calendar year is the product obtained by multiplying the 
output of the covered entity by both the emissions intensity factor determined 
pursuant to clause (i) and the electricity efficiency factor determined pursuant to 
clause (ii) for the year concerned.” The “emissions intensity factor” in a regu-
lated electricity market is “the average [GHG] emissions (expressed in tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalents) per kilowatt hour of the electricity purchased by the 
covered entity, as determined by the Administrator based on reports provided 
under subparagraph (D).” “In a wholesale competitive electricity market, the 
emissions intensity factor is the average [GHG] emissions (expressed in tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalents) per kilowatt hour of the marginal source of supply 
of electricity purchased by the covered entity, as determined by the Admin-
istrator `based on reports provided under subparagraph (D).” “The electricity 
efficiency factor is 85 percent of the average amount of electricity (in kilowatt 
hours) used per unit of output for all covered entities in the relevant sector or 
sub-sector, as determined by the Administrator based on reports provided under 
subparagraph (C).”
47  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, supra note 36, § 405(b).
48  See id. Titles I and IV.
49  Also known as H.R. 1862, the bill was introduced on April 1, 2009 and was 
referred to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce. 
H.R. 1862, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).




54  S.3036, 110th Cong. § 6006 (2008). An important difference between the 
Boxer Amendment and S.3036 is that the requirement for U.S. importers to 
submit emissions allowances for the covered goods imported would have gone 
into effect from January 1, 2020 under S.3036, meaning that there would have 
been an eight-year delay between requiring emissions allowances from domes-
tic manufacturers (which would commence in 2012) and from importers. In 
contrast, the Boxer Amendment incorporates only a two-year delay between 
domestic and international requirements, requiring importers to purchase and 
produce emissions allowances beginning from January 1, 2014. A further 
difference concerns how key terms in the border adjustment measures are 
defined, thus having an impact on how these measures will be implemented 
and enforced. Baseline emissions level used to calculate emissions attributable 
to covered goods, and to determine whether comparable actions have been 
taken, would be calculated as of 2005 levels in the Boxer Amendment, but as 
of the period from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014 under S.3036. While 
the Boxer Amendment specifically addresses the calculation of allowances for 
goods from multiple covered countries, S.3036 does not. Further, under the 
Boxer Amendment, the definitions of comparable action and the formulas to 
be used by the EPA are far more developed and fully conceptualized than in 
S.3036. For example, in contrast to the methodology described above in the 
section on the Boxer Amendment, the methodology for calculating the interna-
tional allowance requirements under S.3036 only covers the initial compliance 
year, and is defined as “for each category of covered goods of each covered 
foreign country” it is “equal to the quotient obtained by dividing (i) the excess, 
if any, of the total emissions from the covered foreign country that are attribut-
able to the category of covered goods produced during the most recent year for 
which data are available, over the baseline emission level of the covered foreign 
country for that category; and (ii) the total quantity of the covered good pro-
duced in the covered foreign country during the most recent calendar year.” Id. 
§ 6006(d)(2)(A). The legislation is designed so that the allowance requirements 
would be adjusted later:
(i) in accordance with the ratio that (I) the quantity of allowances 
that were allocated at no cost to entities within the industry sector 
manufacturing the covered goods fro the compliance year during 
which the covered goods were imported into the United States, bears 
to (II) the greenhouse gas emissions of that industry sectors; and  
(ii) to take into account the level of economic development of the 
covered foreign country in which the covered goods were produced. 
Id. § 6006(d)(2)(B). While the Boxer Amendment’s methodology is more 
detailed and complex, its basic principles are roughly the same as in S.3036.
55  H.R.6186 was introduced in the House of Representatives on June 4, 2008, 
and referred to the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment on 
June 12, 2008. No further action has been taken on this bill. H.R. 6186, 110th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).
56  H.R.6316 was introduced into the House of Representatives on June 19, 
2008 and referred to the House Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit, Energy 
and Research on November 19, 2008. No further action has been taken on this 
bill. H.R. 6316, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).
57  However, there are some significant differences between the Boxer Amend-
ment and H.R.6316 that are worth noting. Perhaps the most significant differ-
ence between the two is that, unlike the Boxer Amendment, which requires 
imports from any foreign country not on the exempted list to submit emissions 
allowances, H.R.6316 applies only to countries that are members, or observant 
governments of, the WTO, defined in the bill as “WTO participants.” Imports 
from countries that are not WTO participants are not regulated under this 
legislation, and therefore efforts to limit GHG emissions and spread the cost 
of regulation among nations do not extend to countries outside of the WTO. 
Another significant difference is H.R.6316’s inclusion of provisions for nego-
tiating agreements with WTO participants who are developing countries to 
secure comparable action on GHG emissions, including offering countries will-
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ing to negotiate such agreements preferential access to the domestic U.S. car-
bon market. H.R.6316 § 115(b)(1). The preferential agreements could include 
incentives such as the ability of the WTO participant to choose its base year or 
its maximum GHG emissions limits for its system, rather than requiring it to 
match the U.S. limitations in order to access the U.S. carbon market. Id. The 
negotiated agreements would only be available on a “first-come, first-served” 
basis, and would not be negotiated in a way that would breech this emissions 
budget. Id. Finally, the requirement for importers to provide emissions allow-
ances on imports from covered countries would begin from January 1, 2015 
under H.R.6316, rather than on January 1, 2014 under the Boxer Amendment. 
Therefore, H.R.6316 allows for a three-year implementation gap before imple-
menting the border adjustment measure, rather than a two-year gap indicated 
under the Boxer Amendment. H.R.6316. § 111(d)(1).
58  The GATT is incorporated into the set of agreements known collectively as 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which 
entered into effect on January 1, 2005. 
59  For instance, one line of cases suggests that the definition of “like” is 
broader under Article III.4 than it is under Article III.2. See World Trade Orga-
nization, Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC – Asbestos”), ¶¶ 87-154, 
WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12, 2001). 
60  The Mercado Común del Sur (“MERCUSOR”), is a regional trade agree-
ment in South America.
61  World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres (“Brazil – Tyres”), ¶ 232, WT/DS332/
AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
62  World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“U.S. – Shrimp”), ¶¶ 
122-24, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 22, 2001).
63  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. (1994) [hereinafter 
TBT Agreement].
64  See e.g., Statement of Joost Pauwelyn, “Testimony Before the Subcommit-
tee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means,” March 24, 2009. 
On page 13 of his written statement, Professor Pauwelyn refers to “a carbon 
assessment on a product-specific basis by, for example, allowing an importer 
to demonstrate the actual carbon-footprint of a specific batch of imports.” 
(Emphasis in the original.)
65  TBT Agreement, supra note 63, art. 2.1.
66  Id. art. 2.2.
67  Id. art. 2.4.
68  Id. art. 12.
69  The Emission Migration Prevention with Long-term Output Yields Act 
(“H.R. 1759”), introduced by Representatives Jay Inslee and Mike Doyle on 
March 26, 2009, provides an example of the adoption of technical standards 
in legislation designed to address GHG emissions. H.R. 1759, 111th Cong. 
(2009). Although this legislation does not apply to imported goods, it does 
apply to domestic industries in a way intended to defend against carbon leak-
age. Under the proposal, emission allowances would be distributed to industries 
vulnerable to external competition as a result of the imposition of a cap-and-
trade program. The allowances would be subject to a declining cap, which 
would force industries either to adopt clean technologies and become more effi-
cient, or, alternatively, to move operations offshore to avoid U.S. restrictions. 
Given that the adoption of such technical standards to determine distribution of 
emissions allowances could force less efficient manufacturers to relocate opera-
tions offshore, rather than adopt expensive, cleaner technologies, it is possible 
that eventually, only the most efficient operators would remain in the United 
States. The most efficient operators then would have to both increase expenses 
to maintain efficiency and defend against competition from manufacturers who 
have moved offshore and are able to produce at lower cost. In short, technical 
standards, when not carefully applied, can have unintended consequences, and 
when applied to imported goods they can trigger a TBT Agreement challenge. 
70  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. (1994) [hereinafter 
SCM Agreement].
71  The SCM Agreement permits WTO Members to take action against foreign 
governments’ subsidies in two distinct ways. The first method is through direct 
challenges that WTO Members may pursue before WTO dispute settlement 
panels pursuant to Part III of the SCM Agreement, which may, if successful, 
result in a WTO ruling requiring that the subsidizing WTO Member terminate 
the subsidy program. Id. pt. III. The second method, authorized in Part V of the 
SCM Agreement, is through the imposition of countervailing duties (“CVDs”) 
on imported products benefiting from alleged subsidies. Id. pt. V.  
72  Such a theory of subsidization would posit that the system norm is the gov-
ernment sale of emissions allowances to manufacturing industries. Thus, the 
provision of allowances to some industries or entities would arguably constitute 
a government decision to forego government revenue otherwise due. Id. art. 
1.1(a)(ii).
73  This observation applies to challenges brought pursuant to Part III of the 
SCM Agreement, for non-export contingent, actionable subsidies. Id. art. 5.
74  The Article 8.2(c) exception covered “assistance to promote adaptation of 
existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or 
regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms,” 
subject to certain specified limitations. Id. art. 8.2(c). It seems this exception 
might have covered a range of emerging clean energy technologies useful in 
mitigating climate change.
75  See id. at Art. 31, concerning period of applicability of SCM Agreement 
Article 8.
76  Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General, Speech before a European Parliament 
panel (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/
sppl91_e.htm.
77  While the levy of an internal consumption tax is also a possibility, it is likely 
that a requirement to submit allowances would optically appear more permis-
sible under the WTO.
78  So, for example, all suppliers of corrosion-resistant or stainless steel sheet 
to a U.S. manufacturer of kitchen appliances would be required to submit emis-
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the suppliers would be able to obtain allowance refunds if they can certify that 
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